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Reducing the Overburden: The Doris Coal
Presumption and Administrative Efficiency
Under the Black Lung Benefits Act
Eric R. Olson
Coal dust build-up prevents many coal miners' lungs from func
tioning properly.1 This condition, commonly referred to as black lung
or pneumoconiosis, can make common activities nearly impossible.2
The Black Lung Benefits Act covers the cost of medical treatment for
many affected miners, though procedural impediments often prevent
miners from receiving care. The miner's current or former employer,
when identifiable, must pay for medical care relating to the miner's
black lung. Most disputes over miners' claims for medical care arise
when the miner has a history of cigarette smoking and the need for
medical care could arise from either coal dust or tobacco smoke be
cause both substances affect the same body systems. Coal companies
prefer not to pay for medical care arising from cigarettes, while miners
do not want their smoking history to prevent coverage of treatment
for their occupational disease, especially when causation has not been
clearly established. To receive payment for care, miners must prove to
the Department of Labor through an often lengthy administrative
process that the medical treatment met the eligibility requirements.
Specifically, miners must assemble both medical documentation de
scribing the treatment and the justification for the treatment in order
to prevail in the administrative hearing.
The current black lung program traces its origin through four ma
jor congressional actions. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") arose out of frustration with state programs
to protect miners and adequately care for those with occupational dis
eases. The 1969 Act represented the first of many comprehensive leg
islative efforts to improve the well-being of coal miners. In addition to
establishing safety standards and authorizing enforcement mecha
nisms, the 1969 Act provided a "limited response in the form of emer
gency assistance" through monthly stipends to miners who suffer from

1. Michael D. Attfield & Gregory R. Wagner, Respiratory Disease in Coal Miners, in
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 413, 413 (William N. Rom ed., 3d ed.
1998).
2. Black lung describes many distinct diseases arising from prolonged coal dust expo
sure, though most attention is focused on coal workers pneumoconiosis (CWP). CWP is a
disease characterized by the buildup of nodules of coal in the lungs that progressively de
creases the ability of the lungs to function. See id.
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pneumoconiosis.3 This "limited response" has taken on a life of its
own over the past thirty years through four subsequent acts and re
lated regulations greatly extending the black lung benefits program.
Courts further complicated this already complex system, often leaving
miners' ability to receive benefits highly dependent on the circuit in
which they brought their claim.
The 1969 Act created four statutory presumptions to remove some
of the impediments facing miners as they sought disability payments.4
Because many eligible miners still did not receive benefits, Congress
passed the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 ("1972 Act").5 The 1972
Act, among other things, covered medical benefits for treating pneu
moconiosis in eligible miners. The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977 further expanded the umbrella of eligibility.6 The Black Lung
Benefits Amendments of 1981 dramatically scaled back the effects of
the Acts in response to the increasing cost of the benefits program to
the government and industry by removing many of the statutory pre
sumptions and increasing the ability of coal companies to contest the
miners' allegations.7 These reductions in the Act,8 however, did not
undermine its central commitment to providing care for eligible min
ers. Rather, the changes limited eligibility requirements by limiting the
class of miners able to receive care and removing some of the statu
tory presumptions aiding miners seeking to establish total disability
due to pneumoconiosis.9
Neither the Act nor the relevant regulations thoroughly describe
the required causal nexus between the miner's pneumoconiosis and
eligibility for medical benefits. The Fourth Circuit, in Doris Coal v.
Director,10 lowered the administrative barrier facing miners by
switching the burden of production fat eligible miners who seek cov-

3. H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at 13.1 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503.
4. 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1994); see also Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Fed
eral Black Lung Program - The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1985).
5. S. REP. No. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2307 (stating that the
rate of denial "suggests strongly that the solution has not been nearly as complete as Con
gress believed and expected it would be").
6. Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978).
7. Many economic and political forces led to the reduction of the benefits program. The
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund ran an estimated deficit of $552 million in 1981 and had a
cumulative deficit of approximately $1.5 billion. See H.R. REP. No. 97-406, at 13.1 (1981),
reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2671, 2680. The balance of power in the White House and
Congress also weakened proponents of the benefits program.
8. "The Act" refers to the currently applicable federal black lung benefits program,
most recently altered by the 1981 amendments discussed supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
9. See Ramsey & Habermann, supra note 4, at 597 (stating that "[t]he major effect of the
1981 amendments . . . has been to return to the evidentiary format set forth in the original
program").
10. 938 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1991).
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erage for pulmonary care. The Doris Coal court held that "when a
miner receives treatment for a pulmonary disorder, a presumption
arises that the disorder was caused or at least aggravated by the
miner's pneumoconiosis."11 This reduction in the burden faced by
miners in the administrative process makes it easier for eligible miners
to receive coverage for medical care. The Department of Labor has
proposed regulations that expressly adopt the Doris Coal presumption
to aid miners as they seek coverage for eligible treatment.1 2 The Sixth
Circuit recently disagreed with the Fourth Circuit, holding the Doris
Coal presumption invalid and requiring the coal miner seeking cover
age for medical treatment to produce evidence demonstrating the
connection.13 This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit's judicial pre
sumption is constitutionally and statutorily permissible and effectively
implements the remedial objectives of the Black Lung Benefits Act.
To receive benefits under the Act, miners must first prove that
they are "totally disabled" due to pneumoconiosis arising at least in
part out of coal mine employment.14 Miners begin the benefit process
by applying for benefits at their Social Security office, and their appli
cation is then forwarded to the Department of Labor.15 Successful
claimants receive a monthly benefit check and are eligible for cover
age of medical care for their "pneumoconiosis and ancillary pulmo
nary conditions."1 6 These two steps are commonly called stage one,
applying for the monthly check, and stage two, applying for the medi
cal benefits.17 Only once a miner has passed stage one can she seek
coverage for the medical benefits under stage two. The Act and ac
companying regulations define "total disability" as a legal term of art
that includes more miners than those totally disabled in fact by pneu
moconiosis.1 8 Miners may receive certain presumptions of total dis
ability based on medical evidence and mining history. Miners who pre-

1 1. Id. at 496.
12. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 55,060 (1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(e)) (proposed
Oct. 8, 1999). In the discussion of the proposed rule, the Department of Labor "propose(s) a
regulatory presumption, based on the Fourth Circuit's approach, that would apply nation
wide." Id. at 54,970.
13. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 514 (6th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit consid
ered Glen Coal in Gulf & Western Industries v. Ling, 176 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1999), and reaf
firmed the Doris Coal presumption.
14. Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1039 (6th Cir. 1993).
15. See Ramsey & Habermann, supra note 4, at 583-84.
16. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701 (2000).
17. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 512 ("The Doris Coal presumption states that if a miner
proves his entitlement to benefits in stage one, the miner is entitled to a presumption in
stage two that the medical bills he presents are related to his pneumoconiosis.").
18. See John S. Lopatto III, The Federal Black Lung Program:
VA. L. REV. 677 (1983).
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sent X-ray evidence of nodules of coal dust in their lung demonstrat
ing complicated pneumoconiosis, also known as progressive massive
fibrosis, receive an irrebuttable presumption of total disability.19 In
addition, miners who are diagnosed by other means receive the same
irrebuttable presumption if the diagnosis shows a condition that could
reasonably be expected to yield evidence of complicated pneumoco
niosis.20 Miners who filed a claim before 1982 received a rebuttable
presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis if: (1) they
mined for at least fifteen years, (2) their chest X-ray was interpreted

negatively, and (3) they proffered other evidence that demonstrated
the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impair

ment.21 A miner who does not meet the requirements of the relevant
presumptions can also meet the total disability requirement by dem
onstrating that "pneumoconiosis prevents him or her from engaging in
gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to
those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he or she previ
ously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of
time."22 The Doris Coal presumption only applies to those miners who
have passed the eligibility requirements of stage one by proving total
disability due to pneumoconiosis.
The Act requires the miner's former employer, when identifiable,
to pay for eligible medical treatment. If the employer seeks to contest
eligibility, the dispute enters an administrative hearing. The Doris
Coal presumption transfers the burden of production from the miner
to the contesting former employer. The burden of production, half of
the burden often referred to as the burden of proof, is the responsibil
ity of producing enough evidence to raise a claim.23 The Doris Coal
presumption does not alter the burden of persuasion, and the miner
retains ultimate responsibility for persuading the tribunal that the
medical care met the Act's eligibility requirements. By transferring the
production requirement, however, the Doris Coal presumption greatly
eases the procedural burden on miners who seek coverage for pulmo
nary care and will result in more coverage for eligible care. Miners no
longer need to produce extensive documentation to receive coverage
for routine care and, because of this reduced hassle, will more likely
seek treatment for their pulmonary ailments.

19. 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(a) (2000).
20. 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(c) (2000).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (2000). Such dated cases are not, unfortunately, merely of his
toric interest. Noah Stiltner, the Doris Coal claimant, originally filed his claim in 1979. Doris
Coal, 938 F.2d at 492, 494 (4th Cir. 1991).
22. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(l)(A) (1994).
23. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 992 (1997); see also Lovilia Coal Co.
v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 452 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing differences between burden of pro
duction and burden of persuasion under the Act).
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This Note argues that courts should adopt the Doris Coal pre
sumption created by the Fourth Circuit. Part I demonstrates that the
Black Lung Benefits Act, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
and the Constitution permit the Doris Coal presumption. Part II ar
gues that the Doris Coal presumption best fulfills the remedial intent
of the Act and results in more efficient administration of the Act. This
Note concludes that courts should follow the Doris Coal presumption
and transfer the burden of production in medical benefit disputes re
garding pulmonary care for covered miners.
I.
The

THE DORIS COAL PRESUMPTION IS PERMITTED

Doris Coal

presumption, like other statutory and regulatory

presumptions, helps to further the purpose of the Act. This Part dem
onstrates that the Act, the APA, and relevant judicial precedent per
mit the Doris Coal presumption. Section I.A demonstrates that the
Act does not limit presumptions to those identified only within the
Act itself. Section l.B examines judicial review of other presumptions
under the Act and concludes that the Doris Coal presumption would
survive scrutiny under every court's approach to examining extra
statutory presumptions under the Act. Section LC argues that the ju
dicial origin of the Doris Coal presumption does not violate the APA
or the Supreme Court's command of judicial deference to administra
tive procedure. Since neither the Act nor other applicable law pre
vents the creation of the Doris Coal presumption, the presumption is
permissible.
A.

Other Presumptions Prohibited

To ease the burden on miners seeking benefits under the Act,
Congress
established
several
statutory
presumptions.24
The
Department of Labor, the administrative agency charged with over
sight of the black lung benefits program, created other presumptions
aiding miners in their applications for benefits.25 While the Act and ac
companying regulations establish certain presumptions, neither the
Act nor the regulations expressly prohibit the creation of additional
presumptions aiding a miner in proving her claim.

24. See Director v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280 (1994) (recognizing that "[i]n
part due to Congress's recognition that claims such as those involved here would be difficult
to prove, claimants in adjudications under these statutes benefit from certain statutory pre
sumptions easing their burden"); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1994); see also supra notes 1 9-22 and
accompanying text.
25. 30 C.F.R. § 718.301-06 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (2000).
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The Act does not limit presumptions to those contained in the
statute itself or regulations.26 Furthermore, the Doris Coal presump
tion does not override any aspect of the Act or accompanying regula
tions. The regulations only address the provision of medical benefits
briefly, stating that the miner shall receive medical treatment "for such
periods as the nature of the miner's pneumoconiosis and ancillary
pulmonary conditions and disability require."27 When a dispute arises
over medical benefits, the regulations order the district director28 to
"informally resolve such dispute. "29 If the parties do not reach an in
formal resolution, the regulations command the district director to re
fer the case to an Administrative Law Judge.30 The Doris Coal pre
sumption does not contravene any part of the Act or regulations
because neither Congress nor the Department of Labor has identified
specific procedural rules to govern the procedure used by the district
director or the Administrative Law Judge.
The Department of Labor has proposed new regulations that ex
pressly adopt the Doris Coal presumption by adding another clause to
the medical benefits section creating a rebuttable presumption that a
pulmonary disorder in the miner is caused or aggravated by the
miner's pneumoconiosis.31 The proposed regulation expands the
regulations and, by implication, demonstrates that the Doris Coal pre
sumption does not contradict the Act or current regulations. In other
words, the proposed regulations only add, in relevant part, an addi
tional subsection to section 725.701, leaving the existing four subsec
tions unchanged. By adding to the current regulations rather than
changing the existing language, the proposed regulations demonstrate
that the Doris Coal presumption supplements, rather than contra
venes, the current regulatory scheme.
B.

Judicial Review of Other Extrastatutory Presumptions

Changes to the administrative process that shift the burden of per
suasion violate the APA, while alterations that move the burden of

26. See Lovilia Coal, 109 F.3d at 451; see also infra Section II.A, discussing Congress's
statement that the statutory presumptions were not meant to be exclusive.
27. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000).
28. A district director is a claims administrator who is charged with specific duties under
the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 725.lOl(a)(ll) (2000).
29. 20 C.F.R. § 725.707(a) (2000).
30. 20 C.F.R. § 725.707(b) (2000) (stating that "such hearing shall be scheduled at the
earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all other requests for hearing").
31. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 64
Fed. Reg. 54,966, 55,060 (1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(e)) (proposed Oct. 8,
1999) ("If a miner receives a medical service or supply, as described in this section, for any
pulmonary disorder, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the disorder is caused or
aggravated by the miner's pneumoconiosis.").
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production do not. The Supreme Court in Greenwich Collieries ex
amined the Department of Labor's "true doubt rule," a rule that en
abled the claimant to collect benefits when the evidence is "equally
balanced."32 The Court held that, under the APA, such a rule imper
missibly changed the burden of persuasion and that agencies are not
free to decide who shall bear the burden of persuasion in proceedings
carried out under the AP A.33 In so doing, the Court recognized the
appropriateness of other statutory and regulatory presumptions that
ease or shift the burdens of production placed on the miner.34 The
"true doubt rule," however, attempted to "go one step further."35
Consistent with most other judicial and administrative proceed
ings, the Act places the burdens of both production and persuasion on
the claimant during the initial application for benefits. The Doris Coal
presumption intervenes to shift the burden of production only after
the miner has established total disability and sought medical benefits.
Under the Doris Coal presumption, the miner retains the burden of
persuasion at all times. Even the Sixth Circuit, when it declined to
adopt the Doris Coal presumption, expressly held that since the Doris
Coal presumption "merely reallocates the burden of production, and
does not affect the burden of proof,"36 it does not violate the APA or
Supreme Court precedent.37 Because the Doris Coal presumption, un
like the presumption at issue in Greenwich Collieries, only alters the
burden of production, it does not contravene the Court's holding.
The Eighth Circuit in Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, the only other
court to examine presumptions for black lung claimants under
Greenwich Collieries, held presumptions that reallocated the burden
of production but not the burden of persuasion valid.3 8 In Lovilia, the
Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs urged the
court to adopt the Director's "one element standard," a standard ena
bling a previously denied miner to reopen his claim for benefits upon a
showing that "one element" of his condition has changed.39 The court

32. Director v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 269 (1994).
33. Id. at 280-81 (holding that the APA was designed to introduce "uniformity of proce
dure and standardization of administrative practice" and that allowing agencies to alter bur
den of persuasion defeats that purpose).
34. Id. at 280 ("(I]n part due to Congress's recognition that claims such as those in
volved here would be difficult to prove, claimants in adjudications under these statutes bene
fit from certain statutory presumptions easing their burden. Similarly, the Department's so
licitude for benefits claimants is reflected in the regulations adopting additional
presumptions." (citations omitted)).
35. Id.
36. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 1998).
37. Id. at 513 (holding "the Doris Coal presumption withstands scrutiny under
Greenwich Collieries," but invalidating on inconsistency with Sixth Circuit law).
38. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 452 (8th Cir. 1997).
39. Id. at 451.
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held that the Director's interpretation created a presumption, but
equated the presumption to "the statutory and regulatory presump
tions which ease a black lung claimant's burden of production, but do
not shift the burden of persuasion, as that term is used in Greenwich
Collieries."40 The court then held the presumption created by the "one
element standard" valid.41 The Doris Coal presumption more closely
resembles the burden of production shifting character of the "one
element standard" than the burden of persuasion change at issue in
Greenwich Collieries because it only alters who must produce the evi
dence and leaves in place the obligation to persuade the tribunal.
C.

Judicial Origin of Presumption

The Doris Coal presumption differs from all other presumptions
related to the Act because it arose in the courts, rather than in the
Department of Labor or Congress. At first blush, such an origin would
seem to conflict with the Supreme Court's clear mandate that courts
"are not free to impose upon agencies specific procedural require
ments that have no basis in the APA."42 The Doris Coal presumption,
however, differs significantly from the type of procedural require
ments imposed upon agencies that the Court has struck down. Doris
Coal does not relate to rulemaking,43 impose additional requirements
on the agency or the adjudicative process,44 or alter the substantive
rights of parties before the agency.45 Rather, the Doris Coal presump
tion merely changes the burden of production at one step of the ad
ministrative process with regard to individual claimants who have al
ready met the procedural requirements and proved their eligibility
under the program.
In Vermont Yankee, the most definitive statement on the interplay
between courts and agencies in determining proper administrative
procedures, the Court relied on two prior Federal Communications

40. Id. at 452-53.
41. Id.
42. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (summarizing
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978)).
43. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (holding that the APA "established the maxi
mum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon
agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures" (citing United States v. Florida East Coast
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742
(1972))).
44. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (stating that courts are "generally not free to
impose" additional procedural rights on the agency). The Doris Coal presumption does not
create or impose additional procedural rights, rather it transfers one obligation - the bur
den of production - from the miner to the coal company contesting payment.
45. See Director v. Greenwich Collieries, 527 U.S. 267, 271 (1994) (discussing the prohi
bition against altering the substantive rights of parties before the agency under the Act).
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Commission (FCC) decisions to hold that the development of proce
dures should be left to the discretion of the agencies.46 Those prior de
cisions emphasized the congressional determination that the agencies
have more familiarity with the industry and problems presented by the
regulations and are therefore better positioned to create effective pro
cedures.47 In Vermont Yankee, the Court overturned the D.C. Circuit's
invalidation of orders of the Atomic Energy Commission by requiring
the agency to include additional information-gathering procedures. In
the two FCC decisions relied on by Vermont Yankee, the lower courts
had ordered the agency to redecide, in essence, a prior decision utiliz
ing different procedural rules.48 The Court reversed both times.
The Court's strong statements against judicial imposition of addi
tional procedural requirements might seem to include the Doris Coal
presumption within its broad ban. Such a claim, however, fails to rec
ognize the distinction between imposing additional procedural re
quirements on the agency and altering procedural requirements of
parties before the agency. Unlike the judicial intervention at issue in
Vermont Yankee and related cases, the Doris Coal presumption does
not force new or additional procedures on the agency. Rather, the pre
sumption just shifts the burden of production from one party to the
other, leaving the entire administrative procedure intact. Eligible min
ers who seek coverage for medical bills still must persuade the same
Administrative Law Judge through the same procedural process as
they would without the presumption.
In addition, the Doris Coal presumption meets the standards for
agency-created presumptions. Presumptions "must rest on a sound
factual connection between the proved and inferred facts."49 As dem
onstrated in Part II infra, the Doris Coal presumption arises out of
clear, established medical facts. In addition, the Doris Coal presump
tion does not alter the substantive rights or obligations of the parties.
Because the Doris Coal presumption only affects the burden of pro
duction, and not the burden of persuasion, the potential harm created
is significantly less than in situations where the presumption changes

46. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
47. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289 (1965).
48. In Schreiber, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that certain docu
ments subpoenaed by the FCC should be held confidential. The Supreme Court rejected
such a procedural requirement, holding that "in providing for judicial review of administra
tive procedural rule-making, Congress has not empowered district courts to substitute their
judgment for that of an agency." Id. at 290-91. In FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., the
D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to set aside permits issued using a comparative-basis proce
dure and repeat the process using an independent procedure. The Court reversed, on the
grounds that the "subordinate questions of procedure" were left to the FCC. 309 U.S. 134,
138 (1940).
49. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc, 442 U.S. 773, 787 (1979); see also Mobile, Jackson
Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
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the underlying burden of persuasion. The miner still must persuade
the Administrative Law Judge that her medical care relates to her
pneumoconiosis.
The language of the Act, the tenor of the regulations, and the
Supreme Court's express examination of presumptions under the Act
demonstrate the appropriateness of the Doris Coal presumption. The
Department of Labor's proposed regulations expressly adopting the
Doris Coal presumption further show that the presumption does not
overlap with or change the current Act or regulations. In the current
regulatory silence, the Doris Coal presumption does not override the
agency's ability to interpret or administer the Act.
II.

THE

DORIS COAL PRESUMPTION IS THE BEST APPROACH

This Part argues that the Doris Coal presumption furthers
Congress's intent and promotes efficiency and consistency. Section
II.A demonstrates that the remedial nature of the Act supports the
Doris Coal presumption. Section 11.B argues that the Doris Coal pre
sumption produces more efficient administration of the Act. Section
11.C contends that the presumption results in a consistent and fair ap
plication of the Act. These benefits flowing from the Doris Coal pre
sumption help reduce administrative costs and increase the number of
eligible miners receiving their allotted coverage.
A.

Remedial Nature of the Act

This Section demonstrates that the Doris Coal presumption fur
thers Congress's remedial goal. First, this Section addresses the con
text from which the original Act arose. This Section next examines the
meaning of "remedial" within the statute. Third, this Section shows
that the legislative history supports a broad interpretation of the Act
that gives effect to its remedial nature. Finally, this Section examines
the Department of Labor regulations and judicial implementation of
the Act and finds that the Doris Coal presumption aids this remedial
goal.
The 1969 Act emerged from an environment in which coal miners
faced many problems when they sought aid under state workers' com
pensation programs for their occupational diseases.50 The 1969 Act
sought to remedy these failures of the state workers' compensation

50. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1994) (stating that "few States provide benefits for death or dis
ability due to [pneumoconiosis] to coal miners"); H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at 13 (1969), re
printed in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2516 (describing "the failure of the States to assume
compensation responsibilities for the miners covered by this program").
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programs, and this remedial purpose continues today. s1 The Act
authorizes approved state programs to administer black lung benefits
programs; however, the Department of Labor has yet to approve any
state workers' compensation program. s2 Thus, the black lung benefits
program continues to provide the main remedy for coal miners af
flicted with pneumoconiosis. s3
Congress's characterization of the Act as remedial signifies that it
sought to fix the failure of state workers' compensation systems to
provide adequately for the needs of coal miners with pneumoconiosis.
Congress explicitly stated the problem that it sought to remedy with
the Act - "Congress finds . . . that few states provide benefits for
death or disability due to [pneumoconiosis]." s4 Traditional state sys
tems did not adequately cover coal miners because of the severe proof
problems facing miners seeking coverage for occupational disease. ss
Occupational disease arises over a long period, often exceeding the
relevant statute of limitations, and frequently cannot be traced to a
specific employer or time of exposure. s6 Congress expressly stated its
intention "that the act be construed liberally when improved health or
safety to miners will result." s7
The 1969 Act did not meet the expectations of many of its sup
porters, leading to the passage of the 1972 Act. s8 The Senate Report to
the 1972 Act again clearly expressed its remedial intent:
The Black Lung Benefits Act of
to improve upon the

1969

1972 is intended to be a remedial Jaw -

provisions so that the cases which should be

51. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (stating "that few States provide benefits for death or disability
due to this disease to coal miners" and that "the purpose of this subchapter [is] to provide
benefits" to miners).
52. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 62 Fed. Reg. 3337, 3347 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997) (stating "[t]o date, no state law has
been approved" under the Act).
53. 20 C.F.R. § 722.152 (2000) (stating that the secretary has not identified any state that
"provides adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis"). A few miners qualify for state workers'
compensation benefits, but the federal program provides the only coverage in the country
that is geared towards the occupational disease of coal miners.
54. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a).
55. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 921-25
(1980).
56. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 66-68 (1984); Compensating Vic
tims of Occupational Disease, supra note 55, at 921-27.
57. H.R. REP. No. 91-761, at 63 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A. N. 2578, 2578. The
committee continues, "it is the purpose of this title to provide such benefits and to insure
that future adequate benefits are provided to coal miners . . . where disability or death oc
curs from [pneumoconiosis]." 1969 U.S.C.C.A. N. at 2603.
58. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A. N. 2305, 2305 (stating
"[t]he Committee fully intends and expects that [the 1972 Act] will more adequately meet
the objectives originally sought in [the 1969 Act]").
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In the absence of definitive medical
conclusions there is a clear need to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled
miner or his survivors.59

compensated, will be compensated.

Congress recognized that many miners faced procedural hurdles that
prevented compensation, especially due to disputes over the exact na
ture of the miner's pulmonary impairment. 60 The 1977 Act also im
plemented changes that were "remedial in nature" by adding an addi
tional presumption facilitating the collection of benefits by miners who
had worked in the mines for many years.61
The Department of Labor and courts have recognized the broad
remedial purposes of the statute and have applied its benefits provi
sions generously. 62 In addition, many courts expressly recognize the
remedial and compensatory purpose of the Act and hold that they
should thus construe the provisions liberally.63 These holdings make
sense given Congress's meaning of remedial: if the Act seeks to rem
edy overly restrictive denials of benefits, the cure should be more lib
eral standards for benefits.
The language of the statute reflects this remedial approach in its
use of presumptions. Recognizing that many miners would have diffi
culty establishing entitlement to the benefits offered by the Act, Con
gress created several statutory presumptions to ease the miners' evi
dentiary requirements.6 4 Congress created the presumptions to reflect
their belief that there was a strong statistical likelihood that miners
meeting the requirements of the presumption would also meet the re
quired elements of total disability but for the difficulty of establishing
definitive medical evidence.65 From a policy perspective, the presump-

59. S. REP. NO. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2315 (emphasis
added).
60. See, for example, statement by Senator Robert C. Byrd: "Let us stop quibbling with
dying men as to whether their lungs are riddled with black lung or whether they are affected
with asthma, or silicosis, or chronic bronchitis." Id. at 2314.
61. H. REP. NO. 95-151, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 37, 240.
62. 20 C.F.R. § 718.3(c) (2000) ("Congress intended that claimants be given the benefit
of all reasonable doubt as to the existence of total or partial disability or death due to pneu
moconiosis.").
63. See, e.g., Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1994); Wiley v. Con
"' solidation Coal Co., 892 F.2d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 1989); Rose v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 614 F.2d
936, 939 (4th Cir. 1980); Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d 307, 313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
65. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-743 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2317
(quoting testimony by the Surgeon General regarding the fifteen-year presumption that
"[f]or work periods greater than 15 years underground, there was a linear increase in the
prevalence of the disease"). The state of the medical knowledge at the time of the Acts dif
fers from current knowledge. See Mark E. Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative
History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of Its Unresolved
Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 869 (1981). The relevant set of knowledge needed to analyze the

intent of Congress, however, is the set of knowledge reflecting medical wisdom at the time
that Congress passed the Acts.
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tions serve to approximate the occurrence of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis while resolving uncertain cases in the miners' favor.
These statutory presumptions operate during the adjudication of the
benefit application.
Since the statute expressly authorizes the Department of Labor to
create other presumptions as part of the implementing regulations, the
absence of the Doris Coal presumption from the statutory scheme
does not preclude its later creation. Congress, by delegating much of
the regulatory scheme, did not purport to create a definitive list of
presumptions in the statute. As discussed supra, the Act represented a
rare entry into the field of workers' compensation that Congress gen
erally leaves to the states. Congress's unfamiliarity in administering
such occupational protection programs counsels against giving great
weight to any omission.
The Doris Coal presumption operates in a similar manner to the
statutory presumptions, but during the second stage of the benefit ap
plication process. Observing that most pulmonary care provided to
miners who have established total disability due to pneumoconiosis
will relate to their pneumoconiosis, the Doris Coal court created an
evidentiary presumption that best reflected that relationship.66 Of
course, the pulmonary care will not always relate to the miner's
pneumoconiosis, so the presumption is rebuttable.67 The rebuttable
nature of the presumption also balances concerns that the remedial
nature of the Act does not improperly enlarge the Act beyond its leg
islative mandate. If the remedial nature of the Act has justified expan
sive coverage with regard to the stage one monthly pension, courts
should apply similarly expansive standards for medical benefits.68 That
such an approach results in an overbroad pool of eligible miners can
not be used to criticize the awards, as the very point of the Act was to
err on the side of overinclusion, not underinclusion.69

66. The court expressly linked the observation that "most pulmonary disorders are go
ing to be related or at least aggravated by the presence of pneumoconiosis" to the burden of
production shifting presumption that in such cases, "the disorder was caused or at least ag
gravated by the miner's pneumoconiosis." Doris Coal v. Director, 938 F.2d 492, 492, 496 (4th
Cir. 1991).
67. While the Doris Coal court does not use the word rebuttable, their description of the
presumption coupled with judicial and agency interpretation clearly establish its rebuttable
nature. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Director, No. 95-2244, 1996 WL 405222, at *1 (4th Cir.
July 19, 1996) (finding evidence presented "insufficient as a matter of law to establish rebut
tal."); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 64
Fed. Reg. 54,966, 55,003 (proposed Oct. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.701) (cre
ating a "rebuttable presumption").
68. See, e.g., Robbins v. Cyprus Cumberland Coal Co., 146 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 1998).
69. Although the 1981 Amendments limited the eligibility requirements for the Act,
they did not alter the overinclusive definition of pneumoconiosis. The 1981 Amendments
limited eligibility in other ways, such as by removing presumptions based purely on amount
of time spent working as a miner. Because the definition of pneumoconiosis remained un
changed, this overinclusive intent survived the 1981 Amendments.
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The Sixth Circuit in Glen Coal based its holding on the claim that
by not establishing any statutory presumptions in the medical benefits
phase of the Act, Congress "intended for there to be no such presump
tion."70 This assertion improperly imputes intent from congressional
inaction71 and fails to recognize the manner in which the medical bene
fits portion of the Act arose. Entitlement to medical benefits for eligi
ble miners did not arise until the 1972 Act when Congress merely im
ported the current medical benefits structure of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).72 Rather than create
a separate process and associated presumptions for medical benefits,
Congress adopted wholesale a preexisting statutory and regulatory
framework created primarily for the compensation of occupational
injury rather than occupational disease.73 This failure to address the
difference between injury and disease calls into question the Sixth Cir
cuit's assertion that Congress had a clear intent about presumptions
on this issue at all. Indeed, the LHWCA contains statutory presump
tions inapplicable to occupational disease such as presumptions that
the injury was not caused "solely by the intoxication of the injured
employee" or by "the willful intention of the injured employee to in
jure or kill himself."74
Furthermore, failing to create a presumption effectively leaves the
medical benefits sections as a traditional workers' compensation pro
gram like those run by the states plagued by the same tendency to un
dercompensate occupational disease because of the procedural hur
dles faced by potential claimants. At the time that Congress added the
medical benefits provision of the Act, however, it was well aware of
the different success rates of compensation programs with regard to
injury and disease.75 Given that the creation of the whole black lung
benefits program arose in part because of the failure of state workers'
compensation systems to compensate adequately those afflicted with
the occupational diseases of coal mining, imputing to Congress an in
tent to adopt a workers' compensation system to govern medical bene
fits seems problematic. At most, Congress's express statements re-

70. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1998).
71. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 440 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Inaction, we have repeatedly stated, is a notoriously poor indication of congressional in
tent. . . . ); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983).
"

72. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1994).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. The problems of compensating for injury
and disease differ greatly. Indeed, the Act came about because the state workers' compensa
tion programs that were designed to cover occupational injury neglected to fully cover occu
pational disease. See supra text accompanying note 3.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 920(c)-(d) (1994).
75. See Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, supra note 55; Elinor P. Schroe
der, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational
Disease, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 151 (1986).
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garding the failures of workers' compensation systems indicate that it
did not intend the LHWCA provisions to work in a similar manner to
the failed programs they sought to replace.76 At a minimum, congres
sional intent is not obvious, as claimed by the Sixth Circuit.77
An alternative intent likely could have motivated Congress's ac
tions and the Act's express delegation of presumption-creating
authority to the Department of Labor calls the Sixth Circuit's conclu
sion into doubt. The LHWCA was one of the few areas where the fed
eral government ran a program similar to the compensation system
operated by the states.78 Congress could have envisioned the LHWCA
and its attendant up and running administrative staff as one of the few
examples of functioning programs at the federal level and sought to
emulate its success. Finally, the delegation of presumption-making
authority to the Department of Labor prohibits interpreting congres
sional silence as a prohibition on presumptions in general.79
B.

Uniform Application of the Act

This Section describes how the

Doris Coal presumption results in a

more uniform application of the Act. Miners claiming medical benefits
under the Act start the process by filing a medical fee dispute claim
with
the
District
Director
of
the
Office
of
Workers'
Compensation Programs of the Department of Labor.80 A claims ex
aminer at the Department of Labor makes an initial determination,
which, if contested, continues to an informal conference and then on
to a hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge if requested by
one of the parties.81 Appeals then continue to the Benefits Review
Board, and then, if necessary, on to the Federal Courts of Appeals.82
The Department of Labor includes the Doris Coal presumption in its
Judge's Benchbook of the Black Lung Benefits Act, a resource that as-

76. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
77. See supra text accompanying note 70.
78. See Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1086-90 (1999) (discussing the

origin of state workers' compensation systems and the limited nature of federal involve
ment).
79. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see also 30 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1994)
("The Commissioner of Social Security shall by regulation prescribe standards for deter
mining . . . whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. . . . ).
"

80. Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Federal Black Lung Program The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 584 (1985).
81. Id. at 584-85. The claims examiner often requests an independent medical review of
disputed treatment.
82. Id. at 590-95.
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rule that "it is the claimant's burden to provide documentation," but
then exempts the case of pulmonary care by referencing the Doris
Coal decision.84 The Judge's Benchbook, however, recognizes the cir
cuit split and, therefore, provides for different procedural burdens in
the Sixth Circuit and all other Circuits.
As the only appellate court decision regarding medical benefits
disputes prior to Glen Coal, the Doris Coal decision established per
suasive authority that the Department of Labor used in its administra
tive materials as well as its proposed regulations.85 The Sixth
Circuit abandoned this accepted approach in Glen Coal. It justified its
express renunciation of the Doris Coal presumption on the grounds
that any judicially crafted presumption would lead to inconsistent ap
plication of the Act. 86 In actuality, however, the holding itself created
an inconsistent application of the Act by forcing similarly situated
miners in different jurisdictions to bear different burdens of produc
tion. 87 The Sixth Circuit stated that judicial presumptions, in general,
lead to inconsistent application of the Act, and, therefore, the court
should not support the Doris Coal presumption regardless of the in
consistent application created by their holding.88 If uniformity was a
paramount goal, as claimed by the Sixth Circuit, then the measuring
stick should have been the status quo, not some hypothetical world
where other circuit's prior decisions do not receive great weight.
Uniformly applying the Act best effectuates its remedial nature.
Congress passed the Act in response to problems with miners receiv
ing benefits everywhere, not just in isolated states. Because the De
partment of Labor has yet to approve any state's black lung program,
the Act applies with equal force everywhere. Inconsistent application
of the Act undercuts the remedial protections it provides.

83. Office of Administrative Law Judges, Department of Labor, Judge's Benchbook of
the Black Lung Benefits Act (Jan. 1997), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/
blalung/refrnclbbbcon.htm>.
84. Id. at Ch. 19.
85. See id.; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,970 (proposed Oct. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §
725.701(e)).
86. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating "[i]f we were to
[allow the presumption], then the door will be opened to the creation of other judicial pre
sumptions in this Circuit and thereby destroy the desired uniformity of application of the
Black Lung Benefits Act").
87. See 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,970 (stating "the Department believes that black lung
benefit claims adjudication should vary as little as possible from circuit to circuit, and conse
quently continues to propose a regulatory presumption, based on the Fourth Circuit's ap
proach, that would apply nationwide").
88. Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 513-14.
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Efficient Administration of Act

This Section asserts that the

Doris Coal

presumption results in a

more efficient administration of the Act. This Section demonstrates
that the Doris Coal presumption has a sound medical basis and thus
helps decisionmakers reach accurate outcomes more quickly. Subsec
tion C.1 shows that the Act's definition of pneumoconiosis is more ex
pansive than the ordinary medical definition of pneumoconiosis. Sub
section C.2 illustrates that in miners who have met stage one burdens
of proving total disability due to pneumoconiosis, most pulmonary
disorders relate to or are aggravated by their pneumoconiosis. Subsec
tion C.3 contends that the Doris Coal presumption reduces error and
administrative costs more than other alternative systems of dispute
resolution. Subsection C.4 illustrates that the Doris Coal presumption
does not affect the number of fraudulent claims, a concern voiced by
the Sixth Circuit.

1.

The Act's Expansive Definition of Pneumoconiosis

The Act's expansive definition of pneumoconiosis reinforces the
presumption that pulmonary care relates to the miner's

Doris Coal

pneumoconiosis. Congress broadly defined the diseases compensable
under the Act by including an extensive list of diseases in its definition
of pneumoconiosis. Congress stated that the purpose of the Act is to
provide benefits "to coal miners who are totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents of miners whose
death was due to such disease."89 The Act defines pneumoconiosis as
"a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respira
tory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employ
ment. "90 A medical definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP)
refers to "a well-defined medical entity resulting from the deposition
of coal mine dust in the lung and from the reaction to the deposited
dust resulting in coal macules, coal nodules, and progressive massive
fibrosis."9 1 CWP displays a characteristic pathological feature of coal
dust laden macrophages (large cells that ingest foreign materials).9 2 As
the amount of coal dust in the lung increases, CWP inhibits the lung's
ability to exchange carbon dioxide and oxygen. 93 Significant impair-

89. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1994).
90. 30 u.s.c. § 902(b).
91. Attfield & Wagner, supra note 1, at 413.
92. Jerome Kleinerman et al., Pathology Standards for Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis,
103 ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY LABORATORY MED. 375, 376 (1979).
93. Ronald G. Crystal, Interstitial Lung Disease, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 396,
398 (James B. Wyngaarden ed., 1992).
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ment of the lung by CWP does not occur until advanced stages of
CWP, known as complicated CWP or progressive massive fibrosis.94
The Act's definition does not reference medical definitions, spe
cific symptoms, or indicators of pneumoconiosis. Courts recognize that
the legal definition of pneumoconiosis is broader than the medical
definition.95 Legal pneumoconiosis is distinct from clinical pneumoco
niosis in two ways: (1) legal pneumoconiosis covers more diseases than
clinical pneumoconiosis and (2) legal pneumoconiosis requires less
proof to establish than clinical pneumoconiosis. Indeed, courts have
specifically examined diseases other than pneumoconiosis with very
different disease mechanisms and determined their fit under the legal
definition of pneumoconiosis.96 The regulations reiterate the Act's
broad definition of legal pneumoconiosis.97
The methods of diagnosis permitted under the Department of La
bor regulations support the inclusion of other diseases under the ru
bric of legal pneumoconiosis. The current regulations outline four
ways that miners can establish pneumoconiosis: (1) a chest X-ray; (2) a
biopsy or autopsy; (3) a statutory presumption, if applicable; and (4) a
physician exercising sound medical judgment.98 Clinical pneumoconio
sis can only be diagnosed through an X-ray or biopsy, thus the recog
nition that the diagnosis of a physician exercising sound medical
judgment or even qualification via presumption allows for the diagno
sis of a disease that qualifies as legal pneumoconiosis, even though it
may not qualify as clinical pneumoconiosis.99 The regulations bolster

94. CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 2338 (James B. Wyngaarden ed., 1992) ("Simple
coal workers' pneumoconiosis most often consists of radiographic abnormalities without
symptoms.").
95. "Although 'coal workers' pneumoconiosis' may be used synonymously with pneu
moconiosis in medical circles, the two terms are distinct legally. First, § 718.201 includes coal
workers' pneumoconiosis as only one of several possible ailments which could satisfy the
legal definition of pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, the comparative breadth of the legal defi
nition contained in § 718.201 is indicated by its inclusion of certain disorders which medically
are different from pneumoconiosis. . . . Clearly, the legal definition contained in § 718.201 is
significantly broader than the medical definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis." Hobbs v.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819, 821 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Cornett v.
Benham Coal, Inc., 227 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2000) .
96. Compare Littlepage v. Director, 890 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding
that pulmonary fibrosis without other supporting medical evidence to establish a significant
relationship to coal mine dust does not fall within the Act's definition of pneumoconiosis),
with Warth v. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 60 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that Chronic
Obstructive Lung Disease is encompassed within the definition of pneumoconiosis for the
purposes of entitlement to black lung benefits).
97. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (2000) (stating "[t]his definition includes, but is not limited to,
coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmo
nary fibrosis, progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis").
98. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202 (2000).
99. James L. Weeks & Gregory R. Wagner, Commentary: Compensation for Occupa
tional Disease with Multiple Causes: The Case of Coal Miners' Respiratory Diseases, 76 AM.
J.
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the conclusion that CWP is but one of many diseases that qualify as
legal pneumoconiosis.100 A report reviewing the black lung benefits
program by the General Accounting Office supports this distinction,
stating that "in most cases, medical evidence was not adequate to es
tablish a coal miner's disability or death from black lung," however,
even where medical evidence was lacking, the award of benefits was
"legal under existing legislation."101 The report expressly recognized
the broad definition of pneumoconiosis under the Act and regulations.
Courts differ on the required causal nexus between legal pneumo
coniosis and the miner's disability. All base their analysis on the regu
lations established by the Department of Labor, but come to divergent
conclusions. Under the broadest standard, currently advocated by the
Sixth Circuit, the miner must prove that her disability was caused "at
least in part" by pneumoconiosis.102 Other circuits require that pneu
moconiosis must be "at least a contributing cause" of the miner's dis
ability to merit benefits.103 The Third and Eleventh Circuits require
the most restrictive causal nexus between pneumoconiosis and the
miner's disability, holding that the pneumoconiosis must be a "sub
stantial contributing factor."104
Under the "substantial contributing factor" test, a smaller subset of
miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis and other pulmonary im
pairments will receive benefits under stage one of the Act than under
the broader "at least in part" or "contributing cause" test. Thus, if
medical science supports the Doris Coal presumption for miners
whose pneumoconiosis "at least in part" caused them to be totally dis
abled, the presumption will draw even stronger support for miners
whose pneumoconiosis is a "substantial contributing factor" in their
disability. This Note, therefore, examines the relationship between

tissue from biopsy or autopsy specimens or by the findings on a chest x-ray film" and that
"[t)he key difference between the medical and Congressional definitions is that the Congres
sional term does not imply exclusive reliance on a single diagnostic procedure").
100. See supra note 97.
101. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LEGISLATION ALLOWS BLACK LUNG BENEFITS
TO BE AWARDED WITHOUT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY iii (1980).
102. Adams v. Director, 886 F.2d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that miner must show
totally disabling respiratory impairment due at least in part to his pneumoconiosis and
adopting the language in 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(a)). The Sixth Circuit later elaborated, stating
that a miner must prove more than a de minimis or infinitesimal contribution by pneumoco
niosis to his total disability. Peabody Coal Co. v. Smith, 127 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 1997).
103. See Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1990); Shelton v.
Director, 899 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1990); Mangus v. Director, 882 F.2d 1527, 1531-32 (10th
Cir. 1989).
104. Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
black lung claimant must "establish that his pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributing
factor in the causation of his total pulmonary disability"); Bonessa v. United States Steel
Corp., 884 F.2d 726, 734 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that miner must show that pneumoconiosis
is a "substantial contributor" to his disability).
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medical science and the Doris Coal presumption in miners whose
pneumoconiosis "at least in part" caused their total disability.

2.

Pulmonary Disorders Likely Have Sufficient
Relationship to Pneumoconiosis

Miners enter stage two of the application process when they seek
coverage for medical benefits. 105 They will have already established
that they are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis under one of the
three standards identified above.106 The most controversy arises when
miners who smoke or used to smoke attempt to claim benefits under
the Act.107 Even in these difficult cases, medical science supports the
Doris Coal presumption because most pulmonary care received by
miners who have met the stage one burden of proving total disability
will "relate to or be aggravated by" their pneumoconiosis. Thus, under
the Doris Coal presumption, miners seeking coverage for pulmonary
care do not have to carry the burden of production, significantly re
ducing the procedural hurdles faced by the miner.
Coal miners have elevated death rates due to numerous lung dis
eases: CWP, emphysema, influenza, asthma, tuberculosis, chronic ob
structive pulmonary disease, and chronic bronchitis.108 In addition to
higher prevalence of respiratory diseases among the mining popula
tion, studies causally link coal mining to specific diseases. Exposure to
respirable coal dust can cause emphysema.109 Research also links the
incidence of bronchitis directly with the amount of inhaled dust.110

105. See supra note 17 (discussing stage one and stage two).
106. Thus, the question becomes: with miners who are totally disabled due to pneumo
coniosis (that is, miners whose pneumoconiosis is "at least in part" a factor in their total dis
ability) are most pulmonary disorders related to or at least aggravated by their pneumoco
niosis?
107. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 690 (1991) (discussing the
proper regulations to apply to a miner who smoked for thirty-four years); Glen Coal Co. v.
Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 507 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying benefits to miner who smoked for thirty
five years). See generally, e.g. , W.K.C. Morgan, On Dust, Disability, and Death, 134 AM.
REV . RESPIRATORY D ISEASE 639 (1986); Thomas M. Roy et al., Variability in the Evalua
tion of the Federal Black Lung Benefits Claimant, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 937 (1987);
Weeks & Wagner, supra note 99.
108. Attfield & Wagner, supra note 1, at 425; B.G. Miller & M. Jacobsen, Dust Expo
sure, Pneumoconiosis, and Mortality of Coalminers, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 723, 730
(1985).
109. See Leigh et al., Quantitative Relation Between Emphysema and Lung Mineral
Content in Coalworkers, 51 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL . MED. 400, 404 (1994); V. Anne
Ruckley et al., Emphysema and Dust Exposure in a Group of Coal Workers, 129 AM. REV .
RESPIRATORY DISEASE 528, 528 (1984) (concluding that "the association observed between

exposure to respirable coal dust and emphysema in coal miners indicates a causal relation
ship"); G. Worth, Editorial: Emphysema in Coal Workers, 6 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 401, 403
(1984) (stating "very often the [coal] dust causes pulmonary emphysema").
110. S. Rae et al., Chronic Bronchitis and Dust Exposure in British Coalminers, in
883, 893 (W.H. Dalton ed., 1971). But see Leigh et al., supra note
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Unlike CWP, however, miners with emphysema and bronchitis re
sulting from coal mine dust exposure do not have distinctive lesions
that identify the occupational cause.111 In addition, emphysema and
bronchitis have other non-occupational causes such as smoking.
Smoking does not affect the development of simple CWP.11 2 Dis
putes remain, however, about how lungs react to tobacco smoke and
coal dust. Some researchers find that no synergistic effect occurs be
tween smoking and coal dust exposure,113 but others find that smoking
is more of a factor than coal dust exposure in the development of pul
monary impairment.114 Smoking can add additional impairment of
lung function significantly in miners who have CWP so that they meet
the "total disability" test described in the regulations.115 In other
words, of two miners, a smoker and nonsmoker with identical devel
opment of CWP, the smoker may qualify for benefits while the non
smoker may not be sufficiently disabled to meet the total disability
test. This bias is only reflected, however, when diagnosis occurs
through the use of objective evidence other than the chest 'radiograph
to diagnose CWP, since the chest x-ray allows accurate determination
of the extent of CWP.1 16 The regulations allow miners whose diagnosis
reflects both damage from coal dust and tobacco smoke to qualify for
benefits, as they expressly state that a miner with a negative chest x
ray may still receive benefits if a doctor using sound medical judgment
declares the miner to have pneumoconiosis.11 7
109 (noting that bronchitis observed at autopsy is not associated with years of work at the
coal face).
1 1 1. See Attfield & Wagner, supra note 1, at 413.
1 12. See M. Jacobsen et al., Smoking and Coalworkers' Simple Pneumoconiosis, in
INHALED PARTICLES IV 759, 759 (W.H. Walton ed., 1977) (concluding "the main variable
determining the development of simple pneumoconiosis is exposure to airborne dust, and
that this effect is not modified appreciably by whether or not coal miners smoke").
1 13. Michael D. Attfield & Thomas K. Hodous, Pulmonary Function of U.S. Coal Min
ers Related to Dust Exposure Estimates, 145 AM. REV. OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 605, 60708 (1992) (finding that the combined effect of smoking and dust exposure was not worse

than the additive effect of each, as measured by pulmonary function).
1 14. S. Rae found that for most age groups and overall the prevalence of symptoms of
bronchitis is more than doubled in smokers compared with nonsmokers, suggesting that
smoking is more likely than coal mining to contribute to bronchitis. Rae, supra note 1 10, at
892.
1 15. Another researcher demonstrated that cigarette smoking emerged as the primary
variable associated with pulmonary impairment severe enough to warrant a financial award
under present legislation. Thomas M. Roy et al., Cigarette Smoking and Federal Black Lung
Benefits in Bituminous Coal Miners, 31 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 98, 98 (1989).
1 16. Roscoe C. Young, Jr. & Raylinda E. Rachal, Pulmonary Disability in Former Ap
palachian Coal Miners, 88 J. OF THE NAT'L MED. ASS'N 517, 51 8 (1996). See also Roy et al.,
supra note 1 15, at 98 (concluding "the present federal legislation intended to identify and

remunerate those who suffer lung impairment from chronic occupational exposure to coal
dust is biased in favor of those who sustain additional damage to their ventilatory capacity
by smoking cigarettes").
1 17. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202 (2000).
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Thus, even if both smoking and pneumoconiosis contribute to a
miner's pulmonary disability, coverage for pulmonary care is appro
priate. Complications from smoking and pneumoconiosis often inter
act to create health problems that neither one would bring about on its
own.118 Where the two elements (smoking and coal mining) work to
gether to create greater medical problems, the Act and regulations
mandate that such medical problems shall be covered.119 Not only do
the regulations allow such a miner to prove disability, they sanction
such an award by stating that the miner shall receive treatment for
such conditions as her "pneumoconiosis and ancillary pulmonary con

ditions and disability require[s]."120 Given the miner described above,
the portion of the miner's disability related to smoking is an ancillary
disability compensable under the Act.
It is very hard for medical examination to determine which part of
the disability comes from coal dust exposure or smoking in a particular
miner.121 Thus, policymakers must attempt to extrapolate results of
group studies of causation and effect down to the level of the individ
ual.122 While such a practice is a crude tool fraught with error with re
gard to the individual, the net error diminishes when such information
is used in public policy decision-making. The Doris Coal presumption
may not accurately reflect the medical condition or treatment of an
individual miner, but by creating a presumption that is more likely
than not to reflect the situation in the case at issue, it reduces net error
in resolving miner's claims. Again, in the clearly false individual cases,
the coal company can rebut the presumption by showing that the
treatment at issue did not fall within the scope of coverage of the Act.

3.

Reduced Error and Administrative Costs

The Doris Coal presumption shifts the burden of production to
approximate actual probabilities. As shown above, eligible miners
seeking medical care will, more likely than not, qualify for treatment
under the Act. As such, the burden-shifting presumption better re
flects the actual situation of a population as a whole and saves admin
istrative costs. This population-level accuracy does not mean that
those miners who seek coverage for ineligible medical benefits should

1 18. See supra notes 1 12-115.
1 19. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000).
120. 20 C.F.R. § 725.70l(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
121. Weeks & Wagner, supra note 99, at 59-60 (concluding that " [w]hen discussing
compensation policy, the problem with considering these other conditions caused by or ag
gravated by exposure to coal mine dust is that causes can be assessed qualitatively but can
not be precisely apportioned in an individual").
122 See SIR AUSTIN BRADFORD HILL, A SHORT TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL STATISTICS
288-96 (1976).
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automatically receive coverage in the name of administrative effi
ciency. Rather, the rebuttable nature of the presumption encourages
the coal company or the government to produce information demon
strating the ineligibility of the medical services.1 23
By switching the burden of production, the Doris Coal presump
tion best fulfills the remedial nature of the Act while placing proper
incentives on parties to produce relevant information. In a system with
a bimodal choice of outcomes - coverage for the disputed medical
treatment or no coverage - an allocation system that initially appor
tions liability based on the best guess as determined by medical prob
ability will result in the most correct outcomes.124 Imagine the situation
in which a miner's pulmonary impairment arises either from complica
tions from smoking or pneumoconiosis. There, traditional preponder
ance of the evidence analysis tells us that if the miner can establish
with more than a 0.5 probability that the condition is due to pneumo
coniosis, she should receive full coverage. Alternatively, if the miner
can establish only a 0.4 probability, then she should not receive cover
age. In such a situation, where the probability is greater than 0.5, a
presumption of coverage most effectively approximates the likely out
come and reduces costs to the miner and administrative system. A sys
tem that consistently created inaccurate results would not have high
administrative costs if practical or legal obstacles prevented parties
from correcting those mistakes. Such a system, however, would not
fulfill the requirements of the enabling statute. In a system that values
correct outcomes, a process that creates the most number of accurate
results at first will have lower administrative costs than one that re
quires extensive administrative procedures to correct erroneous initial
determinations.
The Act and regulations mandate coverage both for conditions
caused by pneumoconiosis and for ancillary conditions, effectively in
cluding the situation arising when both smoking and pneumoconiosis
contribute the pulmonary impairment.1 25 As the Sixth Circuit de
scribed in Glen Coal, "this definition could be met by simple synergy
(i.e., another pulmonary disease that combines with pneumoconiosis
to cause a sum of disease greater than the two parts), or by relatedness
(i.e., another pulmonary disease that would be either absent or signifi-

123. The responsible party receives information about the requested treatment when
the miner requests coverage. If the responsible party seeks to contest eligibility, normal dis
covery procedures allow them full access to the miner's medical file. For a typical discussion
of how responsible parties can rebut the Doris Coal presumption, see Glen Coal Co. v. Seals,
147 F.3d 502, 508 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing opinion of Administrative Law Judge that ap
plied the Doris Coal presumption).
124. For a general discussion of the comparative accuracy rates of the preponderance of
evidence rule, see Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring
Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 703-04 (1 990).
125. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000).
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cantly less virulent but for the pneumoconiosis). "126 Frequently,
smoking and coal dust exposure interact to cause synergistic or related
diseases, thus meeting the required causal nexus.

4.

Fraud

The Sixth Circuit stated that the Doris Coal presumption would
free doctors of the requirement of showing the "relation between the
treatment and the pneumoconiosis" and thus greatly increase the op
portunity for fraud.1 27 The court dismissed the employer's ability to
rebut the presumption by saying that the "employer is not in as good a
position to obtain such evidence as is the treating doctor."1 28 The doc
tor, the argument goes, would not have anyone looking over her
shoulder to ensure that she doesn't receive payment for noneligible
(or nonexistent) care. The court based this argument on erroneous as
sumptions about incentives and opportunities facing doctors.
Under the Doris Coal presumption, claimants still only receive
coverage for eligible medical benefits, and the opportunity for fraud
does not increase. The miners just receive a presumption that pulmo
nary care sufficiently relates to their pneumoconiosis.1 29 The presump
tion does not change the underlying burden of persuasion, but merely
reallocates the burden of production. Employers remain free to rebut
the miner's evidence through a variety of means and the miner must
ultimately convince the factfinder that the care met the eligibility re
quirements. Regardless of the Doris Coal presumption, the burden of
production is never on the doctor, nor is she a party to the claim.
By claiming that the employer is not in as good a position to obtain
evidence as the treating doctor, the Sixth Circuit, by implication,
claims that the doctor is in the best position to produce information
about the miner's treatment. This doctor-as-best-problem-solver ar
gument, however, fails to recognize that the claimant'.s doctor plays
the same role regardless of the presumption. Under both regimes, the
doctor can fraudulently prepare medical bills for unrelated treatment.
The best-problem-solver argument loses its charm when it is precisely
the fraudulent behavior of the best problem solver that the court seeks
to monitor. In addition, other mechanisms for the reduction of fraud
in the black lung benefits program better serve to police behavior.1 30

126. Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 514.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Examples of other mechanisms include greater administrative monitoring, more
severe sanctions for violations, and expanded incentives for miners and medical providers to
report fraud.
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CONCLUSION
The Doris Coal court injected a common-sense presumption into
the adjudication process for already-eligible miners seeking coverage
for medical care. This change is consistent with the Act, current stric
tures covering the relationship between agencies and courts, and the
agency's existing presumptions. The burden-shifting presumption also
increases the accuracy and efficiency of the black lung benefits pro
gram while maintaining an opportunity for coal companies to contest
payments for ineligible care. Universal adoption of the Doris Coal
presumption will help to reduce the role of geography in providing
medical coverage for eligible miners and ensure that the black lung
benefits system is administered in a more fair and equitable manner.

